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Abstract 
We examine socio-economic indicators relevant to ‘low cost carriers’ (LCCs) in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and review the evolution of air transport liberalization 
and air service agreements in the region. We analyse the business strategies of MENA-based 
LCCs and using a benchmarking methodology, we compare the business strategy of Air Arabia 
Group with those of dominant European LCCs easyJet and Ryanair. Our economic development 
indicators suggest future potential for LCC growth in Iran and Saudi Arabia while other MENA 
countries continue to face challenges. The lack of success in regional liberalization in air 
transport is restricting LCC growth although individual MENA countries have or will benefit 
from ‘open skies’ agreements. MENA-based LCCs while retaining some characteristics of the 
LCC model also deviate in significant ways. Benchmarking analysis shows that Air Arabia’s 
business strategy represents a departure from the business strategies that have been most 
successful in Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores the current environment, prospects and strategies of so-called ‘low cost 
airlines’ (LCCs) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.3 Specifically, we examine 
economic development indicators to determine the general environment facing LCCs, we review 
the evolution of air transport liberalisation and air service agreements and we compare the 
business strategies of MENA-based airlines in the low cost sector with those of successful 
European LCCs. 
 The MENA region has recorded impressive growth in air passenger traffic in recent 
years. Much of this growth has been fuelled by the emergence of Middle Eastern carriers focused 
on international long haul flights. Between 2009 and 2013, passenger traffic between MENA 
countries and the Americas, Asia Pacific and Europe regions grew 18%, 33% and 22% 
respectively and over the same period passenger traffic within the MENA region also increased 
22%.4  While such growth is impressive, the MENA LCC sector currently accounts for a much 
smaller market share compared with LCCs elsewhere in the world.  In 2014, LCCs accounted for 
15% of available seat kilometers within the Middle East and 7% to/from the Middle East. 
Similarly, within Africa LCCs account for around 10% of total seat capacity.5 These market 
shares are significantly lower than those for LCCs in Europe, North America and Southeast Asia. 
Why have LCCs in the MENA region not been more successful relative to their counterparts 
around the world? One potential reason is that the region is at stage in its economic development 
in which inhibits faster growth for LCCs. One might also consider whether a lack of trade 
liberalization in air services has created a more restrictive environment for the low cost sector in 
MENA countries. Thirdly, it is possible that MENA-based LCCs differ in their business 
strategies in ways that result in lower market shares. We investigate all of these potential 
explanations.  
 We begin with an economic overview of MENA countries that attempts to identify 
possible indicators of demand for air transport and for LCCs in particular. In section 3, we 
review the recent history and current state of intra-regional and inter-regional air transport 
                                                 
3 MENA encompasses Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, the 
Palestinian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (KSA), Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
4 See Amadeus (2014) 
5 OAG (2012), CAPA (2013). Note that the LCC shares of capacity for within the African continent overstates the 
current role of LCCs in Northern countries as much of the LCC presence is in South Africa. 
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liberalization agreements and in section 4 we examine the characteristics and evolution of 
MENA-based ‘LCCs’ and utilize a benchmarking methodology to compare the business strategy 
of Air Arabia Group with those of established European LCCs easyJet and Ryanair. We offer 
some concluding remarks in section 5. 
 
2. Economic Indicators of LCC Sector Growth 
Data availability for MENA countries is a challenge, however we have assessed the current 
environment and potential for growth in air transport (and LCCs in particular) using five 
indicators;  
1. Macroeconomic (GDP) growth – a general indicator for air travel demand. 
2. Median income per capita – a proxy for the size of the middle income class. 
3. Urban development and geography - measuring the extent to which there are cities 
within a country that can support domestic LCC travel. 
4. Internet penetration - a measure of the ability of airlines to sell directly to their 
customers via online distribution and sales. 
5. The trend in foreign visitor spending - a proxy for the extent to which a country is 
becoming a destination for inbound air passengers. 
In general, growth in air transport is correlated with macroeconomic growth and associated 
macroeconomic shocks.6 Table 1 shows the size of MENA economies and macroeconomic 
growth over the last five years along with GDP per capita. In 2014, 75% of MENA economic 
output was accounted for by oil exporting countries and 22% by Saudia Arabia alone. With the 
exception of Iran, Kuwait and Libya, the oil exporting MENA countries have recorded higher 
GDP growth rates than the global rate of 2.49%. Among oil importing countries, Jordan and 
Tunisia also recorded superior rates of macroeconomic growth with Israel and Morocco growing 
at around the global rate. Per capita GDP varies wildly across MENA countries from $3,036 
(Egypt) to $96,732 (Qatar) however this tells us little about the distribution of income. 
An important contributory element in domestic demand for low cost air travel demand is a 
growing middle class. As Schlumberger and Weisskopf (2014) argue, without a middle income 
class even low airfares are unaffordable to a large segment of a given domestic population. 
Measuring the size of a country’s middle class is a non-trivial exercise that requires data 
concerning both the amount and distribution of income. Gini coefficient measures 
 
 
                                                 
6 See for example Hansman and Ishutkina (2009). 
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Table 1: GDP, GDP Growth and Per Capita GDP for the MENA Region by Country 
  
Average annual 
% growth 
Annual % 
GDP growth  
Annual % 
GDP 
growth  
GDP  
(Current $US) 
Millions 
GDP per 
capita 1 
Oil Exporting Nations 2011-2014 2013 2014 2014 Current $US 
Algeria 3.18 2.80 3.80 213,518 2013 
Bahrain 3.90 5.41 4.48 33,851 $5,484 
Iran, Islamic Rep. -0.11 -1.91 4.34 425,326 $24,854 
Iraq 6.48 6.57 -2.12 223,508 $4,721 
Kuwait 3.95 1.15 -1.62 163,612 $6,587 
Libya 1.21 -13.55 -24.00 41,143 $46,841 
Oman 3.20 3.91 2.89 81,797 $18,815 
Qatar 6.70 4.58 3.98 210,109 $93,552 
Saudi Arabia 5.37 2.67 3.47 746,249 $24,231 
United Arab Emirates 5.25 4.32 4.57 399,451 $44,276 
Oil Importing Nations           
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.08 2.11 2.20 286,538 $3,036 
Israel 3.43 3.25 2.55 305,675 $35,373 
Jordan 2.78 2.83 3.10 35,827 $5,098 
Lebanon 1.78 0.90 2.00 45,731 $9,754 
Morocco 3.85 4.73 2.42 110,009 $3,060 
Tunisia 1.94 2.89 2.70 48,613 $4,274 
      
USA     $52,980 
Canada     $52,305 
Source: World Bank 
 
(which are available for some but not all MENA countries) provide some information about the 
concentration of income but not the distribution per se.7 For example, according to World Bank 
estimates; Qatar has the same Gini coefficient (41.1) as the USA but these countries do not have 
the same income distribution or size of middle class.  
Table 2 shows Median per-capita GDP measures for MENA countries obtained from on-
site surveys carried out by Gallup in each country over several years. This measure of per-capita 
income is the best available proxy for the size and spending ability of a middle income class and 
provides a very different picture than that created by per capita GDP. For example, the study 
finds that median per capita income in Qatar is $5,117 (expressed in PPP international dollars). 
Even if this dollar figure is biased downwards, it indicates a very large gap between per capita 
GDP and the actual incomes of many citizens and residents. 
 
                                                 
7 The same Gini coefficient value can be obtained from different distribution functions. For example, a Gini 
coefficient of 50 could be derived from an income distribution in which half of the population have all the income 
and the other half have nothing or from a distribution in which 20% of the population are extremely wealthy, 60% of 
the population are quite poor and 20% have nothing. 
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Table 2: Per Capita GDP and Median Income by Country 
MENA Countries 
  
Median per capita income 2  
PPP International dollars 
Oil Exporting Nations 2006-2012 
Algeria $1,392 
Bahrain $4,778 
Iran, Islamic Rep. $3,115 
Iraq $617 
Kuwait $7,487 
Oman .. 
Qatar $5,117 
Saudi Arabia $4,762 
United Arab Emirates $4,041* 
Oil Importing Nations   
Egypt, Arab Rep. $623 
Israel $7,847 
Jordan $1,559 
Lebanon $2,960 
Morocco $1,135 
Tunisia $1,646 
    Developed Countries  
USA $15,480 
Canada $15,181 
Source: Gallup (2013); *Estimate for UAE from Tong (2010). 
 
As a benchmark, the US and Canadian median per capita incomes in the same Gallup 
study were around $15,000. Of MENA countries, Israel has the highest median per capita 
income at $7,847 followed by Kuwait. Incomes in Qatar, KSA and UAE are lower but 
approaching the income levels of the top three MENA countries. Elsewhere median incomes are 
very low; in Egypt the Gallup study indicates a median per capita income of $623. All of this 
suggests that a resident middle class is yet to emerge in the region as a source of demand for air 
travel.  
 
Internet Usage 
The internet has played an important role in the historic development of LCCs because it 
facilitated a simplified pricing structure and online sales and distribution thereby eliminating 
traditional travel agencies as intermediaries. The ability to do this relies on a population that has 
access to and is comfortable with making online purchases.8 Internet usage is very high in the 
                                                 
8 It bares remembering that internet usage can spread rapidly within a population. In 1998 in the UK, when LCCs 
were in their infancy, internet usage stood at 7.4%, which grew to 26.8% in 2000 and to70% by 2005. 
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Gulf states; in Bahrain, Qatar and UAE 90% of the population are using the internet.9 Saudia 
Arabia has a lower percentage of internet users (64%) but usage grew 34% between 2011 and 
2014. In contrast, only 32% of Egypt’s population were internet users in 2014; a figure that was 
nevertheless 23% higher than 2011. Iran also has a lower percentage of internet users (39% in 
2014), but usage is growing fast with a 107% increase over 2011. More generally, forecasts of 
online travel market growth in the Middle East region appear to be positive.10  
 
Urban Development and Geography 
The degree of urban development combined with geographic dispersion and 
concentrations of population can provide an indication of the potential for growth in domestic 
short haul air travel within the MENA region. Table 3 shows the total population, the percentage 
of the total population living in urban agglomerations of more than one million people, the 
number of large and medium sized cities and the number of airport cities located at least 350km 
from the city with the largest airport (based on passenger volumes).  
  
Table 3: City Dwellers, Number of Large Cities and Distance Between Airport Cities by Country (2014). 
  
Population 
(2014) 
% of Total Population in 
Urban agglomerations of 
more than 1 million 
2011-2015 
Number of 
cities with 
population  
> 1,000,000 
Number of cities 
with population 
500,000-
1,000,000 
Number of airport 
cities 350k or more 
from the city with 
the largest airport 
Algeria 38,934,334 7% 1 3 7 
Bahrain 1,361,930 .. 0 1 0 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 78,143,644 26% 8 5 10 
Iraq 34,812,326 27% .. .. .. 
Kuwait 3,753,121 71% 2 0 0 
Oman 4,236,057 .. 0 0 1 
Qatar 2,172,065 .. 0 1 0 
Saudi Arabia 30,886,545 46% 4 4 8 
United Arab Emirates 9,086,139 51% 3 0 0 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 89,579,670 26% 4 2 9 
Israel 8,215,300 57% 0 0 1 
Jordan 6,607,000 17% 1 1 0 
Lebanon 4,546,774 48% 1 0 0 
Morocco 33,921,203 23% 2 6 4 
Tunisia 10,996,600 18% 1 2 3 
Sources: World Bank11; citypopulation.de; Google maps. 
                                                 
9 Based on number of internet users (for all devices including mobile phones) per 100 people between 2011 and 
2014 (World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2) 
10 For example, Phocuswright (2015) forecast that online travel bookings will grow to 36% of total bookings by 
2018. 
 
11 See data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.URB.MCTY.TL.ZS  
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Some (geographically) smaller countries (Kuwait, Israel, UAE and Lebanon) have a large 
percentage of the population living in urban agglomerations with the population concentrated in 
one or two cities; little potential for a domestic LCC network. However some larger countries 
show a significant degree of urban development and a potential for growth in domestic air travel. 
With a total population of around 31 million people, KSA has a significant amount of urban 
development with 46% of the population living in relatively large cities. In addition, there are 
eight airport cities located at least 350km from Jeddah. Iran with a large population of around 78 
million currently has 13 cities with a population of more than 500,000 with 26% of the 
population living in large urban areas. In addition to urban concentrations, Iran has 10 airport 
cities that are at least 350km from Tehran. Egypt also has potential in this regard, with nine cities 
more than 350Km from Cairo however the country does not perform well on any of the other 
indicators.  
In addition to the measures of urban development and geography, one can also consider 
the state and development of the airport network within a country. Iran and KSA have a larger 
numbers of passengers spread across several airports, while UAE demonstrates its hub role with 
a very large volume of passengers distributed over a cluster of three proximate airports. Egypt 
and to some extent Morocco and Tunisia also have domestic airport networks in which capacity 
is diffused rather than concentrated at one location. 
 
Spending by Foreign Visitors 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the recent trend in spending by foreign visitors. While 
foreign visitor spending is growing in some Gulf states, not surprisingly, it represents a small 
part of the economies of oil exporting countries, remaining steadily at or below 5% of the value 
of total exports since the mid-2000’s.12 For oil importing MENA countries, spending by foreign 
visitors represents a more important sector of the economy, ranging from 5% (Israel) to 35% 
(Jordan). Figure 2 shows how Egypt in particular suffered a significant decline in foreign visitor 
spending following the ‘Arab Spring’ uprising in 2011. More recently the terrorist bombing of a 
Russian aircraft departing from the popular tourist destination Sharm Al Sheikh represents 
another negative shock to inbound tourist travel to Egypt.  
 
                                                 
12World Travel and Tourism Council (2016) Data Gateway: http://www.wttc.org/datagateway/ 
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Figure 1: Spending by Foreign Visitors (millions of real $US);  
Oil exporting MENA countries; 2006-2015 
 
Source: World Travel and Tourism Council (2016) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Spending by Foreign Visitors (millions of real $US);  
Oil importing MENA countries; 2006-2015 
 
Source: World Travel and Tourism Council (2016) 
 
Overall Assessment 
From the five indicators outline above, Iran emerges with one of the strongest potentials for 
growth in LCCs. The only category in which Iran does not perform well (foreign visitor 
spending) is due to economic sanctions and restrictions on trade imposed and recently by the US 
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and Europe. The other top performer is KSA which, like Iran, performs well on all metrics 
except foreign visitor spending. However in this category KSA does show positive growth. Of 
the oil importing countries, only Egypt and Morocco indicate a potential for a growth in 
domestic demand for LCC’s however neither of these countries performs well on the other 
metrics. As a country with potential to increase inbound LCC traffic, Israel shows the most 
potential of the oil importing countries especially since it is the latest MENA country to sign an 
‘open skies’ agreement with the Europe.  
 
3. Air Transport Liberalization 
 An important element in creating opportunities for LCCs is the liberalization of air 
transport markets (Itani, O’Connell and Mason, 2015). In Europe the evolution of LCCs occurred 
in tandem with liberalization (Mason Morrison and Stockman, 2013) and there can be little doubt 
that the removal of restrictive bilaterals have had a significant impact on the success of the LCC 
business model.13  
 Historically, MENA countries have lagged behind the rest of the world in terms of the 
restrictiveness of the environment governing air travel. Bochert et al (2013), construct a trade 
restrictiveness index for cross border air passenger transport and find that in 2005, high income 
Gulf countries had the most restrictive environment for cross-border air transport compared with 
other Middle Eastern countries. In their study, the trade restrictiveness index for high income 
Gulf countries is almost double that of high income OECD countries; a result which reflects a 
relative lack of success in achieving intra-regional liberalization in air transport, despite attempts 
in both Africa and the Middle East to do so.  
 In 1999, the Council of Arab Transport Ministers formed an agreement to liberalize air 
transport through a gradual easing of regional restrictions on Middle-Eastern carriers in existing 
air service agreements. Schlumberger and Weisskopf (2012) report that following the 1999 
agreement, some 17 ‘open skies’ agreements (OSA’s) were signed between a subset of Arab 
countries and in 2004, a regional OSA (the ‘Arab League Open Skies Agreement’) was 
                                                 
13 Whether liberalization was a sufficient rather than a necessary condition for the magnitude of success enjoyed by 
LCCs in Europe is more complex question to answer because there were other contemporaneous elements which 
contributed to the growth of LCCs. Internet technology and aircraft leasing became predominant in the 1990’s and 
both allowed LCCs to enter the market and compete more easily and effectively with incumbent legacy carriers. In 
addition, several negative shocks (the outbreak of SARS, September 11th attacks and the Iraq war for example) 
contemporaneously weakened the competitive position of full service carriers.  
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developed by the Arab Civil Aviation Commission. 14 However only a few countries have 
ratified the agreement (Jordan, Palestine, Syria, UAE and Yemen) despite the prospective 
economic benefits from doing so. 
African countries have a long history of attempts at liberalization dating back to the 
‘Yamoussoukro Declaration’ in 1988.15 In 1999, the ‘Yamoussoukro Decision’ formalized 
agreement between 44 African countries to implement full liberalization of access to all routes, 
capacity, frequency and tariffs including provisions for the granting of 3rd 4th and 5th freedoms to 
African carriers, and for competition and international safety standard compliance.16 Some 17 
year later, the Yamoussoukro Decision has yet to be implemented, due at least in part to 
continued protectionism and inefficient use of air transport infrastructure.17  
 Notwithstanding the lack of progress in regional liberalization, individual MENA 
countries have taken steps towards more liberalized trade in air services via bilateral and 
multilateral OSAs. Table 4 shows the number of bilateral air service agreements (ASAs) and 
OSAs signed by each MENA country between 2000 and 2014. A total of 63 bilateral ASAs were 
signed during this period of which 41% included ‘5th Freedom’ rights, which are not customarily 
included in ASAs.18 The majority of ASAs have emanated from oil producing Gulf states and 
moreover UAE has been particularly aggressive in signing OSAs, claiming to have ratified 
approximately 78 such agreements prior to 2012. 19 More recently, Emirates within the UAE have 
signed OSAs with Finland (2013); Cuba (2014); Burkina Faso (2015); Gabon (2015); Kuwait 
(2015); Sierra Leone (2015) and Slovakia (2015). 
 While the number of air service agreements since 2005 signal a move – particularly in the 
Gulf states – to liberalize access to air transport markets, other restrictions remain regarding  
ownership and control, subsidies to domestic (national) carriers and domestic regulations. 
 
                                                 
14 Countries signing OSAs included Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Syria and UAE. 
15 See Schlumberger (2010). 
16 See IATA-interVISTAS (2014). 
17 See interVISTAS (2014) and Njoya (2016) for example. 
18 Fifth freedom of the air is the right of an airline to carry passengers from its home country to country A, then pick 
up passengers and fly to country B. An example would be the right of Saudia to fly from Riyadh to London (where 
passengers enplane) and then on to New York. Sixth freedom rights enable an airline to carry passengers from 
country B via its home country en route to country A. An example would be the right of Emirates to pick up 
passengers in Mumbai, then fly to Dubai and then on to London.  
19 The signatories to Air service agreements in UAE are often individual emirates or combinations of emirates 
within the federation and so it is difficult to ascertain which agreements apply to which emirates. To date I have 
been unsuccessful in finding any source which catalogues the signatories and details of these agreements.  
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Table 4: Bilateral and ‘Open Sky’ Agreements; MENA Countries (2000-2014)20 
MENA Countries 
Bilateral air 
service 
agreements 
Bilateral air 
service 
agreements 
Bilateral air 
service 
agreements 
Bilateral air 
service 
agreements 
Open skies Agreements 
  
3rd  4th  3rd,4th, 5th 
MENA 
Countries 
Other 
countries   
Oil Exporting Nations 2000-2014 2000-2014 2000-2014 2000-2014   
Algeria 2 0 1 1   
Bahrain 2 8 6 4 
USA (1996); Singapore 
(2005) 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 9 0 7 2   
Iraq 0 0 0 0   
Kuwait 2 1 1 2 
USA (2006); Brunei 
(2009); UAE (2015) 
Libya 0 0 0 0   
Oman 4 3 2 5 USA (2001) 
Qatar 7 5 8 4 Moldova (2015);  
Saudi Arabia 7 1 5 3 USA (2011) 
Syrian Arab Republic .. .. .. ..   
United Arab Emirates 0 3 2 1 USA (1996) * 
Yemen, Rep. 0 0 0 0   
Oil Importing Nations           
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1 0 0 1   
Israel 0 0 0 0 USA (2010); EU (2013) 
Jordan 0 1 0 1 USA (1996); EU (2010) 
Lebanon 1 1 1 1   
Morocco 1 1 2 0 USA (2000); EU (2006) 
Tunisia 1 1 1 1   
 
Nevertheless, some state-owned carriers have moved away from 100% state ownership to partial 
privatization (Royal Jordanian, Middle East Airways and Royal Air) and private management 
companies have replaced government departments or agencies in operating some airports in the 
region (Queen Alia International Airport, Madinah International Airport and Cairo International 
Airport). 
 
 ‘Open Skies’ Agreements with Europe: Morocco, Jordan and Israel 
 To date, three MENA countries have signed OSAs with Europe; Morocco (2006), Jordan 
(2010) and Israel (2013). Figure 3 shows the trend of passenger volumes in Jordan and Morocco 
both prior to and after the agreements.  
 
                                                 
20 WTO Quasar Database; www.wto.org/asap; US Department of State; www.state.gov/e/eb/tra/ata; 
European commission; ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international_aviation/country_index/;  
www.wam.ae/en/news/economics/1395279009309.html. 
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Figure 3: Total Airport Traffic (Passengers); Jordan and Morocco; 1998-201421  
 
  Sources: Anna Aero; Airport International Group; EHCAAN 
 
In Morocco, a significant increase in the growth rate of passengers began as soon as 
negotiations to conclude the agreement were first anticipated (in 2004) and by 2014, total airport 
passengers in Morocco stood at 17 million compared to 6.7 million in 2003. LCCs were virtually 
non-existent in the Moroccan market prior to the OSA with Europe, however once the agreement 
was anticipated, LCCs began to increase their presence reaching a 42% market share in 
international traffic in 2010. This was followed by a downturn in 2011 and 2012 (see Table 6).  
 
 
Table 5: LCC Percentage Share of Total Seat Capacity; Morocco 2004-2012 
 
Domestic International 
2004 0.1 1.7 
2005 0.6 10.4 
2006 1.1 12.4 
2007 2.0 24.4 
2008 4.4 35 
2009 4.2 40.3 
2010 4.7 42.2 
2011 11.9 39.7 
2012 4.6 34.9 
Source: CAPA Centre for Aviation (2012) 
 
In 2013, the top four LCCs (Jetairfly, Ryanair, easyJet and Air Arabia) accounted for 
28.4% of total seat capacity with Royal Air Maroc’s market share at approximately 50%.22 While 
                                                 
21 Jordan passenger numbers do not include a small number of passengers at Aqaba Airport (estimated to be around 
0.2 million in 2010) 
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large, this market share actually represents a significant decline for the state-controlled flag 
carrier. In anticipation of market growth following the Moroccan-EU OSA, Royal Air Maroc  
added a significant amount of capacity and increased the number of its European destinations.23 
Indeed, total air passenger traffic in Morocco increased by 67% between 2005 and 2010, 
however over the same period, RAM suffered a drop in its market share from 71% to 55%. By 
2011 with a smaller share of a larger but more competitive market, RAM was in financial 
difficulty. Consequently the Moroccan government announced a package to improve the airline’s 
performance which included a plan to partially privatize the airline, job cuts and a cash bailout of 
$193m. However RAM has continued to struggle, making losses in 2014 and 2015 and with no 
meaningful privatization having taken place.24 Morocco’s OSA with Europe has thus led to a 
weakening of the incumbent state airline without the emergence of a successful domestic LCC.  
 Jordan’s 2010 OSA with Europe coincided with the ‘Arab Spring’ and so air passenger 
traffic (which had grown at a modest rate prior to the open skies agreement) declined in 2012 but 
recovered in the following year and in 2014 Jordan had a total of approximately 7.1 million 
passengers; a 30% increase over 2010. Unlike Morocco, European LCCs were not as quick to 
enter the Jordanian market. Ryanair has not offered service to Amman following the agreement 
and although easyJet did launch flights between London Gatwick and Amman in 2011, it 
withdrew from the route in 2014. Thus, while OSAs may have been a necessary condition for 
growth in Jordan’s air transport sector such agreements may not have been sufficient to 
encourage growth in the low-cost sector at least via European airlines.25 However in 2014, Air 
Arabia Group purchased a 49% stake in Petra Airlines and launched Air Arabia Jordan – which 
began offering service from Amman in 2015.   
Israel is the most recent MENA country to sign an OSA with Europe. It’s agreement, 
signed in 2013, calls for liberalization to be implemented over a five-year period ending in 2019. 
The response from European LCCs has been more in line with the Moroccan OSA, with easyJet 
expanding its service by 20% in 2014 and Ryanair commencing flights to Eilat Ovda airport in 
                                                                                                                                                             
22 Source: OAG.. 
23 RAM’s available seat kilometers increase by 30% in 2006 over the previous year. 
24 The airline reported a net loss of approximately $28.1m in 2014 (CAPA, 2015). Currently the government owns 
96% of the airline while the remaining portion is held by Air France Group (3%) and Iberia (1%). 
25 There are two country-specific factors that perhaps make Jordan less attractive to European LCCs: first, unlike 
Morocco, Jordan does not have a large segment of the population working in European cities. Secondly, compared 
with Morocco, Jordan’s location makes it a more distant destination in relation to European cities. 
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2015. LCCs Norwegian and Wizz have also entered the market. Consequently in the first year of 
the agreement, the market share of LCCs in Israel grew to 8.8% compared with 2.2% in 2012.  
One potential source of protection for flag carrier El Al’s market share is its enhanced security 
measures which are required by the Israeli government but also subsidized by up to 97.5% of the 
additional costs. People traveling to Israel and especially Jewish travelers with a willingness to 
pay for enhanced security will represent a source of loyalty to a level of security service not 
replicated by LCCs.  
Overall, the lack of success in regional liberalization of air transport in the Middle East and 
Africa represents a constraint on air transport growth and on the strategies and prospects for 
LCCs. Cristea et al (2015) find that Arab countries with more liberal policies have higher 
passenger volumes and more city pairs being served. Their results suggest that that a deepening 
of the Arab League OSA would result in a 30% increase in air passenger traffic. Liberalization of 
access to markets under OSAs and ASAs are a move in the right direction however liberalization 
of ownership and control rules would eliminate the necessity for joint venture expansion 
strategies (currently employed by Air Arabia and fastjet) that involve creating new airlines in 
each country and would instead allow for consolidation and cost efficient expansion of LCCs 
into new markets. 
 
4. LCCs in the MENA Region  
In any air transport market, one might reasonably expect to observe both entry and exit of 
LCCs over time, both as fighting brands created by traditional incumbents and as newly created 
airlines. Mason et al (2013) indicate that between 1995 and 2010, a total of 110 airlines entered 
the European market as LCCs of which 39 evolved from or were created by existing (traditional) 
carriers. By 2010 only 32 LCCs in total and only nine out of the 39 ‘evolved’ airlines were still 
in operation. Of the 78 LCCs that exited the European market, 30 were in business for one year 
or less.26  While at an earlier stage in the development of the low cost sector, the MENA region 
has also witnessed both successful and unsuccessful attempts to enter the LCC sector.  
 
 
                                                 
26 See Mason et al (2013) for full details of entry and exit in the European LCC sector during and following 
liberalization. 
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MENA-based LCCs That Have Not Survived 
Morocco’s, OSA with Europe initially spurred the creation of two domestic LCCs; Atlas 
Blue and Jet4you. Royal Air Maroc created subsidiary Atlas Blue as a ‘fighting brand’ in 2004 
despite evidence that this strategy has been largely unsuccessful for traditional carriers (Morrell 
2005; Dennis, 2007).27 Jet4you was created in 2006 as a joint venture between Moroccan 
investors and TUI travel, a leisure travel company based in the UK.28 However neither of these 
airlines survived as MENA-based LCCs. Atlas Blue ceased operations in 2010 after having 
failed to realise expected cost savings (FlightGlobal, 2013) and in 2012 Jet4you (which had 
become solely owned by TUI Travel in 2008) was merged into the Belgian travel company 
Jetairfly.29  
In the Middle East, Wataniya and Sama are two examples of MENA carriers that shared 
some LCC characteristics but yet did not succeed. Wataniya, based in Kuwait, exited the market 
in 2011 and appears to have chosen an unsustainable business model. The airline combined the 
use of Airbus A320 aircraft with a low seat density (122 seats) and a relatively large business 
class cabin. This strategy was unable to compete with full service airlines (who have larger route 
networks and strong brand identity) for premium business travellers while at the same time 
offering discounts and economy fares. In contrast, Sama was launched as an LCC in Riyadh in 
2007 but exited the market in 2010. Two reasons cited for the airline’s failure were fare caps on 
domestic routes mandated by the Saudi Arabian government and jet fuel subsidies awarded to 
Saudia (the national full service carrier) which made it impossible for Sama to complete. Thus on 
the one hand deficiencies in business strategy design led to failure however the (regulatory & 
legislative) environment also played a role 
 
MENA-based LCCs currently in operation 
Table 6 shows the growth in passenger volumes for MENA-based ‘LCC’ carriers currently in 
operation.  
 
 
                                                 
27 More recently, Israel’s flag carrier El Al has also adopted the fighting brand strategy with the creation of a new 
LCC subsidiary named ‘UP’ which began operations in 2014. 
28 Moroccan investors in Jet4you included Attijariwafa Bank; one of the largest banking and financial groups in 
Morocco. 
29 Jetairfly is the trading name of TUI Airlines Belgium.  
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Table 6: Passenger Volumes and Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) for MENA ‘LCCs’; 2010-2015 
Passengers	(000s) 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 CAGR
Jazeera 1131 1153 1,129						 1,140						 1,165						 1,218						 1.5
Flydubai 848 1410 4,940						 6,820						 7,250						 9,040						 60.5
Air	Arabia 4456 4696 5,301						 6,108						 6,817						 7,460						 10.9
FlyNas 2036 2041 2,865						 3,503						 4,679						 5,800						 23.3
 Source: OAG 
A high degree of variability in passenger growth is evident in the CAGR for these airlines. 
Jazeera, which is more focused on intra-region markets has the lowest CAGR while Flydubai 
which has focused on coordinating inter-regional flights with longhaul carriers has enjoyed an 
impressive 60.5 % CAGR. Both Air Arabia and FlyNas have also enjoyed strong growth. Are 
these differences in growth rates a result of a different strategic approach’s within an overall 
LCC business model? Consider Europe’s most successful LCCs (easyJet and Ryanair) as a 
benchmark with which to compare the business strategies of MENA-based ‘LCCs’. As a first 
pass we compare characteristics which are commonly used to distinguish LCCs from traditional 
‘full service’ carriers. 30 
 
Table 7: Comparing LCC Characteristics 
LCC Characteristics Ryanair easyJet flydubai 
Jazeera 
Airways 
flynas31 Air Arabia 
Single aircraft type Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Point-to-point network Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Block hours per day (aircraft utilization) 8.5 10 13 13 12 14 
Average sector length (miles) 790 650 3,200 750 ..  1,200 
Predominant use of secondary airports  Yes No No No No No 
One cabin class Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Hold baggage included in fare (econ) No No Sometimes Yes Yes No 
Meals/snacks/drinks included in fare (econ) No No No Yes No No 
Sources: Schlumberger and Weisskopf (2014), airline websites. 
 
Table 7 makes it immediately apparent that there are differences between MENA-based 
LCCs and their European counterparts.  Only two LCC characteristics are shared by all the 
airlines in Table 7 namely ‘single aircraft type’ and ‘point-to-point network’. MENA-based 
LCCs typically have more block hours per day than either easyJet or Ryanair and do not utilize 
secondary airports. Air Arabia and flydubai have significantly longer stage lengths than either 
                                                 
30 See for example Williams et al (2003). 
31 Prior to fall 2014 flynas included long-haul flights in its route network and consequently had a mixed fleet and 
longer average stage lengths. However, in 2014 flynas ceased scheduled long-haul flights to focus on short-haul and 
has moved to a uniform fleet (Airbus A320). 
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easyJet or Ryanair and three of the four MENA LCCs offer a business class cabin while two 
airlines include a checked baggage allowance with an economy fare. Jazeera Airways is unique 
in also including meals, snacks and drinks in an economy fare. Of the four airlines, flydubai’s 
business model is perhaps the least like an LCC because of the airline’s integration with longhaul 
operators (including Emirates and Qantas) which allows passengers to purchase their travel to a 
flydubai destination on a single ticket and to have their luggage checked through to the 
connecting flight in Dubai. flydubai offers a total of 89 destinations of which 33 are in the 
MENA region. Non-MENA destinations include eastern Europe, India, and Pakistan giving the 
airline an average sector length that is almost five times that of EasyJet. Thus flydubai’s business 
model is more akin to that of a regional carrier servicing the connectivity demands of full-service 
airline passengers. 
 In contrast to flydubai, Air Arabia Group, founded in 2003 shares five of the eight 
characteristics listed in Table 7 with easyJet and Ryanair.  The Air Arabia Group currently has a 
95 destinations, of which 46 are within the MENA region, 17 are to EU countries and 
Switzerland and 32 are to other international destinations including Urumqui in China (a route 
that falls within the range of its A320 aircraft). Air Arabia has negotiated rights to serve other 
more distant Chinese cities but has elected to wait until future generations of the A320 aircraft 
have a sufficient range to reach them rather than deviate from operating a single aircraft type. 
This aversion to operating a mixed fleet appears to be one of the core elements of the LCC sector 
(see Table 7).32  
 While Air Arabia seems to be following more closely in the footsteps of easyJet and 
Ryanair compared with other MENA-based ‘LCCs’ there are some more subtle differences. For 
example, while Air Arabia offers a single economy cabin, its seating density is significantly 
lower than either easyJet or Ryanair (between 162-168 seats with an interior seating design that 
offers a seat pitch of 32 inches which is above average for economy seats).33 
 
Benchmarking LCC business models 
To look more closely at LCC strategies in the MENA region as compared with European 
LCCs, we employ a benchmarking framework for consistently assessing the business models of 
                                                 
32 flynas experimented with a operating a mixed fleet which included wider body aircraft as part of a strategy to 
offer low cost, long haul service to some Asian cities – a strategy that it eventually abandoned in 2014. 
33 This compares with 30 inches and 29 inches for Ryanair and easyJet respectively. 
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airlines as first suggested by Morrison & Mason (2006), operationalised by Mason and Morrison 
(2008) and extended by Mason, Morrison and Stockman (2013). The analysis takes a ‘product 
and organizational architecture’ (POA) approach to assess how product/service design, benefit 
drivers (value creation), input choice and cost efficiency interact with a firm’s organizational 
design to generate profits.34 A conceptual illustration of POA analysis is provided below in 
Figure 4.  
Figure 4: Product and Organizational Architecture Analysis of Business Strategy 
 
As suggested in Figure 4 the design of a firm’s product or service offering will define a core 
product bundle that creates consumer surplus (i.e. creates value) relative to the firm’s pricing 
strategy which in turn is influenced by the market structure. Additionally however, product 
design also has implications for costs of production (which impacts pricing strategy) and 
organizational structure (what is produced internally and what is contracted out for example) 
Taken together, both product and organizational architecture contribute to the creation and 
sustainability of profits. 
As an implementation of POA analysis, Morrison and Mason (2006) developed a set of 
measurable indices to capture the inter-relationships between an airline’s core product, its cost 
and revenue structure, productivity factors, airports characteristics and market structure. 35 These 
                                                 
34 See Mason and Morrison (2008) for a more detailed discussion of the POA model as it relates to airline business 
strategy  
35 Complete details of the methodology and calculation of indices can be found in Mason and Morrison (2008). 
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descriptors of the business strategy are then related to the overall cost structure and the ability to 
generate revenues and ultimately profits.  Ten market, performance and product indices are built 
using 37 individual data items for each of the airlines incorporated in the benchmark analysis 
(see the Appendix). What emerges is a representation of each airline’s business strategy, relative 
to other benchmarked airlines. 
With regard an airline’s core product bundle, the analysis focuses on three key sets of 
elements that create consumer value: connectivity, convenience and comfort. Connectivity refers 
to the type and extent of the airline’s route network. Increased connectivity holds value for 
consumers but can also increase costs. Connectivity is measured using three components; 
network density (departures per airport per day), number of routes offered and all destinations 
offered at airports served. These three indices thus measure the value proposition inherent in the 
service that an airline elects to provide for its customers. 
The convenience index is composed of average weekly frequency per route, average 
distance of airports from the nearest population centre, the percentage of flights from ‘primary’ 
airports, punctuality (percentage of on-time departures and arrivals) and a baggage service 
quality rating (provided by Skytrax).36  Lastly, the comfort index is composed of four elements; 
average number of passengers per flight, number of cabin crew per flight, economy seat width 
and economy seat pitch. 
In addition to these indices, indices for aircraft productivity, labour productivity, airport 
attractiveness, distribution and market structure are also constructed.  Finally, indices are 
calculated for overall costs, revenues and profitability.37 As outlined in Mason and Morrison 
(2008), correlation coefficients between individual elements in each index and operating profits 
can be calculated and used as weights in the construction of each overall index value. These 
indices are then benchmarked against the ‘best-in-class’ for a reference group of airlines. What 
emerges is a representation of each airline’s business strategy, relative to the other carriers in the 
reference group.  
Mason, Morrison and Stockman (2013) use this approach to characterize two distinct stylized 
business models within the LCC sector. They term these the ‘truly low cost’ model and the ‘full 
                                                 
36 The term ‘primary airport’ is defined as having 10 or more network carriers operating from the airport.  Examples of primary 
(secondary) airports include; Frankfurt (Frankfurt-Hahn), Hamburg (Hamburg-Lubeck), Glasgow (Glasgow-Prestwick), London-
Luton, and Paris CDG (Paris-Orly). 
37 A full listing of the indices and their components is shown in Appendix 2. 
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service competitor’ model. The ‘truly low cost’ model is a business strategy with an unflinching 
focus on low costs. The elements of this model are as follows: 
• Costs drive everything – be the lowest cost competitor 
• Fly to secondary airports 
• Offer low levels of convenience, comfort and connectivity 
• Strive for high aircraft utilization and productivity 
• Strive for low aircraft maintenance costs (fleet uniformity) 
• Strive for high labour productivity 
• Offer low fares  
• Compete aggressively on price to achieve market power in city-pair markets 
• Trade off lower margins against high volumes and low costs to achieve profitability 
 
This low cost focused business strategy is illustrated relative to the index categories developed 
by Mason and Morrison (2008) using a ‘spider web’ diagram as shown in Figure 5 where the 
outer perimeter of the web represents a ‘best-in-class’ score for each index. In Mason and 
Morrison (2008) the measured indices for Ryanair look strikingly similar to this stylized model 
as shown below in Figure 6. An alternative to the ‘truly low cost’ business strategy is the ‘full 
service competitor’ strategy (Mason Morrison and Stockman, 2013) which is focused less on 
cost and more on revenue generation and the capturing of market share for business travel. 
 
Figure 5: A stylized ‘Low Cost Focus’ LCC Business Strategy 
 
Source: Source: Mason, Morrison and Stockman (2013) 
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Figure 6: Benchmarked Indexes for Ryanair (2005) 
 
Source: Mason and Morrison (2008) 
 
Key elements of the ‘full service competitor’ model (illustrated below in Figure 7) are: 
• Offer higher levels of comfort, convenience, connectivity (compared with ‘truly low 
cost’) 
• Fly to select primary airports 
• Not focused on having the lowest costs, but striving to have lower costs than FS 
competitors 
• Attempt to capture share in the business travel market 
• Strive for  lower costs through contracting out, operating a point-to-point network, 
operating a uniform fleet and efficient sales/distribution 
The indices for easyJet calculated by Mason and Morrison (2008) (see Figure 8) map closely 
with this stylized ‘full service competitor’ model. While more focused on revenue generation, 
easyJet has retained several LCC characteristics. 
 
Comparing Air Arabia to easyJet and Ryanair 
The benchmarking analysis of LCC business strategies as outlined above can be employed to 
get a better picture of how a MENA-based LCC’s business model is positioned relative to those 
of successful LCCs in Europe. Ideally we would want to include all the MENA-based airlines in 
this analysis however, Air Arabia is the only publicly traded company in the MENA region that. 
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Figure 7: A stylized ‘Full Service Competitor’ LCC Business Strategy 
 
Source: Source: Mason, Morrison and Stockman (2013) 
 
Figure 8: Benchmarked Indexes for EasyJet (2005) 
 
Source: Mason and Morrison (2008) 
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provides fully audited accounts of sufficient detail. Consequently, for the remainder of this paper 
we focus on Air Arabia 
To compare the business model of Air Arabia with those of easyJet and Ryanair, we have 
recalculated benchmarking indices using updated 2010 and 2014 data. The strategy map based 
on 2010 data suggests that Air Arabia has not followed either the ‘truly low cost’ model or the 
‘full service competitor’ model but instead has followed a hybrid strategy. The measured indexes 
for Air Arabia are illustrated below in figure 9. 
When compared with the strategies for Ryanair and easyJet, we can see that, Air Arabia’s 
strategy is markedly different. Air Arabia’s Labour and aircraft productivity indexes are low. In 
the former case, available seat kilometers per employee is half that of Ryanair's in 2010. While 
Air Arabia does achieve relatively high aircraft utilisation, the number of sectors flown per day is 
lower than either Ryanair or easyJet which reduces its productive capacity. 
 
Figure 9: Benchmarked Indexes for Air Arabia (2010) 
 
 
As pointed out in section 2, some countries in the MENA region have lower (although 
growing) internet usage rates and perhaps as a consequence, Air Arabia makes use of multiple 
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sales channels which lowers the productivity of its sales and distribution index. In area of 
comfort, Air Arabia clearly offers higher levels of comfort compared to either easyJet or 
Ryanair. This is because of their higher seat pitch and smaller number of seats (162-168) 
compared to 180 for easyJet (being increased to 186 in 2016) and 189 for Ryanair. The extra 
comfort may translate into higher revenues for Air Arabia, but it also contributes to a higher cost 
per seat. Air Arabia also delivers a high level of convenience mainly because most of the airports 
it serves are primary airports coupled with a high punctuality rating. The market structure and 
airport attractiveness index measures for Air Arabia as reported here are incomplete (due to lack 
of data availability) however in 2010 the airline had little direct competition on many of its city-
pair markets (based from Sharjah). This helps to generate market power and keeps fares higher 
than they would be with more direct competition. In terms of airport attractiveness, the airline is 
dominant at its base in Sharjah where it and has a 50% ownership stake and which keeps its 
airport costs low, however this is counterbalanced to some degree by its destination airports, all 
of which are large with many airline customers (lower airline bargaining power) and a significant 
number of full service airline competitors. This latter aspect of airport attractiveness is not fully 
represented in this calculation of the index (again due to data limitations). 
 
Air Arabia in 2014 
Business models, especially those in the airline industry, are not static but evolve over time. 
Figure 10 shows benchmarked indices for Air Arabia Group in 2014 as compared with 2010. The 
general ‘shape’ of Air Arabia’s business model is roughly the same, but shows  some 
improvement in labour productivity and profitability however the market structure index has 
weakened, likely caused by a combination of increased competition with flydubai and more 
airline competition at their destination airports. The airline displays a higher comfort index 
relative to 2010 but this has not translated into an improvement in revenues; again a sign of a 
more competitive environment. The airport attractiveness index for 2014 more accurately reflects 
Air Arabia’s airport costs (although these are still estimates, given a sparsity of data) and as a 
result is slightly weaker than in 2010.  
Comparing Air Arabia with Ryanair and easyJet in 2014 (see Figure 11) we can see that 
while the strategies of the European LCCs have evolved to some degree, Air Arabia’s business 
model still differs significantly from each of them. Air Arabia’s lower airport costs at Sharjah 
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and their monopoly on 85% of their city-pair markets (on account of their dominance at Sharjah) 
displace Ryanair as ‘best-in-class’ in terms of airport attractiveness and market structure. 
However, these results should be treated with caution due to data limitations and the fact that 
Sharjah and Dubai International are treated as different city-pair elements. While our 
benchmarking analysis suggests that Air Arabia is not following either of the stylized models 
associated with Ryanair and easyJet, Air Arabia is closer to the ‘full service competitor’ 
conceptual model given its comfort and convenience levels which enable the airline to compete 
with large full service carriers in the region. The airline is able to charge higher prices for this 
service value to some degree but has higher costs as a consequence.  
 
  Figure 10: Benchmarked Indexes for Air Arabia: 2010, 2014 
 
 
Figure 11: Benchmarked Indexes for Air Arabia compared with Ryanair and EasyJet (2014) 
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5. Concluding remarks 
The economic development indicators we have outlined in this paper suggest future 
potential for LCC growth in MENA countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia while other MENA 
countries continue to face challenges in several dimensions. With regards to the role of 
macroeconomic growth in creating a positive environment for low cost air travel it should be 
noted that the most recent growth rates reported in this article are from 2014 and therefore do not 
capture the dramatic fall in the price of oil which represents a severe negative shock to the 
economies of oil exporting countries. While slower growth and lower oil revenues make the 
general environment less favourable for air travel, the current climate may have some positive 
implications for LCCs in the MENA region. With dwindling oil revenues, countries such as 
Saudi Arabia now have a stronger incentive to eliminate costly fuel subsidies to state carriers 
which would allow LCCs to compete more aggressively on price. Indeed, new LCCs are poised 
to enter the market; Al Maha Airways (a subsidiary of Qatar Airways) and SaudiGulf Airlines 
hope to begin services in KSA in 2016. Both airlines received delivery of their aircraft some time 
ago but have had to delay their start dates several as negotiations continue with government 
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authorities. The elimination of fuel subsidies and the easing of price caps on domestic routes in 
KSA will pave the way for LCCs to take more market share away from the state carrier in the 
same manner that occurred in Morocco and is now occurring in Israel. 
The apparent inability to advance regional liberalization in the Middle East and Africa, 
and the continued temptation to protect state-owned or flag-carrying carriers will inhibit the 
growth of the low cost sector. In the absence of broad regional liberalization, we can still expect 
more bilateral ‘open skies’ agreements. Tunisia is favoured to be the next MENA country to sign 
an OSA with Europe and more could follow. However as has been pointed out elsewhere, OSA’s 
that provide unrestricted access to markets are only a partial element that should be expanded to 
include relaxation of ownership and control rules.38  
 Our analysis of business strategies suggests that in general, MENA-based ‘LCCs’ while 
retaining some core characteristics of the low cost model (single aircraft type and point-to-point 
networks) also differ in some important areas (multiple cabin classes, use of secondary airports). 
Our benchmarking analysis reveals that Air Arabia is is following a distinctly different business 
model from either easyJet or Ryanair. One might conjecture that the stages of economic 
development in MENA countries combined with a relatively less liberalized environment have 
redefined what it currently takes to be a successful LCC in the MENA region. In the future with 
a more liberalized environment and a growing middle class we can expect more entry by foreign 
LCCs (such as Turkey’s Pegasus Airlines and AtlasGlobal Airlines for example) and the creation 
of new LCCs. What is not clear is whether today’s dominant MENA-based LCCs will be able to 
adapt and survive in that market environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 For example see InterVISTAS (2009) on the additional benefits of ownership and control liberalization in 
conjunction with market access liberalization. 
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Appendix: LCC Business Strategy Benchmarking Indices39 
 
Index Name Index elements 
Cost drivers Unit cost per ASK 
  
Revenue drivers Yield per RPK 
 Operating revenue per sector 
 Average fare paid (incl. ancillary revenues) 
  
Connectivity Network density – departures per airport per day 
 Routes offered 
 Average flight frequency 
 All destinations available at airports served 
  
Convenience Average frequency per route 
 Airport location - average distance from nearest population centre 
 Flights at primary airports 
 Punctuality 
 Baggage service (customer rating) 
  
Comfort Passengers per flight 
 Economy seat width 
 Economy seat pitch 
  
Distribution/sales Ticketing, sales, promotion expense per passenger 
 Percentage of sales from internet bookings 
  
Aircraft productivity  Aircraft utilization (hours per day) 
 Uniformity of aircraft fleet 
 Aircraft sectors per day 
  
Labour productivity Passengers per employee (adjusted by employee costs as a % of total cost) 
 Employees per aircraft 
 Personnel per ASK 
 Ratio of flight and cabin crew to total employees 
 ASK per employee 
  
Airport attractiveness Percentage of city pair routes in which airline has a monopoly 
 Weighted average annual passengers at airports served 
 Number of full service airlines present at destinations  
 Airport/en route costs per passenger 
  
Market structure Median Herfindahl index on seat capacity 
 Average Herfindahl  index on seat capacity 
 Average number of competitors per route 
 Capacity share of seats 
 Average city size served 
 
  
                                                 
39 Source: Mason and Morrison (2008) 
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Table A1: Data used in the calculation of indices for easyJet, Ryanair and Air Arabia 
 
easyJet Ryanair Air Arabia Air Arbia
2014 2014 2010 2014
Average Sector Distance (km) 1,091 1,249 2,052 1,469
COMPETITIVE POSITION
Profitability
Profitability/Op ratio 114.7% 115.0% 110.3% 114.9%
Load factor 91.7% 82.7% 82.8% 81.4%
Margin between LF & BELF 11.8% 10.8% 7.7% 10.5%
Operating revenue per employee (GBP) 469,168 436,233 261,822 364,376
Competitive Position
Median HHI on Capacity (Seat) 2177 10000 10000 10000
Average HHI on Capacity (seat) 4057 6419 9140 9044
Average No of competitors per route 1.99 1.07 0.3 1.35
Percent of city pair routes are monopolies 24.4% 52.1% 85.0% 72.2%
BENEFIT DRIVERS
Connectivity
Network density - Departures per airport p.d. 8.9 7.7 1.9 2.0
Routes offered 675 1600 46 79
Average frequency per route 12.53 6.31 13.91 12.35
Routes per airport 5.00        8.60        0.98        0.79        
Average aircraft per airport 1.67        1.60        0.53        0.39        
Convenience
Punctuality 87 91 90 85
Baggage Service (Skytrax rating) 3 3 3 3
Comfort
Flight and cabin crew per aircraft 33.9 28.6 31.4 33.0
Passengers per flight 147.3 155.6 133.8 95.2
Passengers per flight and cabin crew members 9,078      9,616      6,169      5,907      
Economy Seat width 17.5 17.2 17.5 17.5
Economy seat pitch 29 30 31 31
Pax per Flight and Cabin Crew 9,078      9,616      6169 5907
COST DRIVERS
Organisational design
Unit cost  (per ASK) GBP pence 4.96 2.81 3.01 3.15
Internet distribution  (%) 90% 99% 60% 60%
Ticketing, Sales, Promotion per pax (GBP) 1.59 1.90 1.37 0.00
     Personnel cost as % Op Cost 12.1% 10.6% 13.9% 14.2%
Flight ops
Most populous aircraft type/mark accounts for fleet 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Fleet utlisation
Aircraft Utlilisation (aircraft hours per day) 11.00 8.81 12.06 14.00
Aircraft sectors per day 5.72 4.84 3.96 3.97
Average sector length (km) 1,091 1,249 2,052 1,469
airport/enroute costs per pax (£) 21.82 11.24 5.10 5.37
Employees
Pax per employee 6,716 8,776 3,181 4,031
adjusted pax per employee 815 929 441 571
Employees per aircraft 43 31 56 43
Personnel cost per ASK 0.60 0.30 0.42 0.45
Flight and cabin crew/total employees 74.0% 91.3% 51.6% 68.2%
Labour cost as % of Total cost 12.1% 10.6% 13.9% 14.2%
flight and Cabin crew/total emp 74.0% 91.3% 51.6% 68.2%
ASK per employee ('000) 8,242 13,475 7,897 10,072
Average wage (GBP) per emp 49,642 40,153 32,883 44,927
Marketing and Pricing
Yield per RPK (GBP pence) 6.21 3.91 4.00 4.44
Yiels per ASK (GBP Pence) 5.69 3.24 3.32 3.62
Operating revenue per sector (GBP) 10,290 7,736 11,014 8,608
Average fare paid (GBP) (incl ancillary rev) 69.86 49.71 82.30 90.39
Ancillary revenue as % of operating revenue 1.4% 24.8% 3.6% 9.8%
Ancillary revenue per passenger £ 1.00 £ 12.31 £ 2.94 £ 8.82
